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On July 5, 2010 a wood pellet silo in Norway exploded when firefighters released inert carbon dioxide into the headspace to lower the oxygen content and 
suppress a smouldering fire. The lesson from this incident is that 
the use of carbon dioxide to suppress silo fires is unsafe. 
Smouldering fires produce flammable pyrolysis gasses. The 
gasses can travel and accumulate, for example in the headspace 
of the silo. The release of carbon dioxide from high-pressure 
cylinders can generate static electricity with sufficient energy to 
ignite the pyrolysis gases. 
SMOULDERING FIRES
Smouldering fires in wood pellets storages can occur for a 
number of reasons. There are plenty of examples in industry 
where pellets self-heat deep inside an undisturbed pile. Another 
known cause is mechanical friction heat in, for example, a roller 
bearing, which can ignite dust particles. Embers can be difficult 
to detect and they can travel in conveyor systems and start fires 
in storage areas.
Water is often an unsuccessful method of fighting smouldering 
fires in bulk storage silos. Water from sprinkler or deluge 
systems will only cause damage to the silo and is ineffective in 
suppressing deep seated fires as the water will generally tunnel 
down through the outside of the material instead of wetting it 
through.
SUPPRESS FIRES WITH INERT GASES
Alternative firefighting strategies have been devised which use 
the injection of inert gases to suppress combustion. Inert gases 
can deplete the oxygen available for combustion and quench 
the pyrolysis. The most commonly available inert gases in large 
quantities are nitrogen and carbon dioxide. 
PYROLYSIS GASES
Oxygen-deficient smouldering fires produce pyrolysis gases. A 
typical pyrolysis gas is carbon monoxide, which is poisonous 
and flammable. The presence of unburned pyrolysis gases is 
a known hazard to firefighters. If a compartment fire has little 
or no ventilation, leading to an oxygen-deficient environment, 
large amounts of unburned gases will accumulate. The gases 
may remain at a temperature hotter than the auto-ignition 
temperature. The sudden access to air by breaking a window 
or opening a door may result in large flames rapidly expanding 
towards the source of oxygen; this is known as a backdraft.
Mixtures of fuel and air will burn only if the concentration of 
fuel is within certain limits, the so-called flammability limits. The 
limits for methane, for example, are five – 15 per cent volume. 
Carbon monoxide has a much wider flammability interval, the 
lower and upper flammability limits are 12.5 - 74 volume per 
cent. Mixtures of pyrolysis gases and air, at temperatures below 
the auto-ignition temperature are therefore likely to be in the 
ignitable range and able to cause an explosion if they meet an 
ignition source. Carbon dioxide may provide that source of 
ignition.
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Top: Water is often an unsuccessful method of fighting smouldering fires in bulk storage 
silos.  
Bottom: A pellet silo exploded in Norway when firefighters injected carbon dioxide 
to quench the smouldering fire. Image courtesy Dag Botnen, Hallingdal brann- og 
redningsteneste, Norway.
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THE NORWEGIAN SILO FIRE
The silo in Norway was half full, with an inventory of about 
3,500 cubic metres of wood pellets. The pellets had self-ignited 
and started a smouldering fire deep inside the pile. The first 
indications of trouble came about midnight when sensors in the 
pile registered elevated temperatures. Later came an alarm from 
the silo’s fixed carbon-monoxide detector. 
Firefighters were quick to order a shipment of nitrogen to be 
able to inject into the silo to quench the fire. For a number of 
reasons — it was late at night and the nitrogen gas production 
facility was located several hundred kilometres away — the tanker 
truck was estimated to arrive about noon. A revised estimate 
pushed the arrival of the tanker to late afternoon, at the earliest. 
Firefighters are people of action and it is easy to imagine 
just how unattractive it must be for them to stand idle next to 
a burning silo, merely waiting for a truck to arrive. Unable to 
wait, firefighters began collecting CO
2
 bottles from nearby power 
stations and industries. Only 22 bottles were available, about 
220 cubic metres of CO
2
 gas, just five per cent of the headspace 
volume. Although the effect of CO
2
 injection was thought to be 
limited because of the limited quantities available, out of sheer 
frustration a CO
2
 attack was decided, in the hope that it at least 
might attenuate the fire until nitrogen supplies arrived. 
A ladder on the silo led to a fixed platform, which provided 
access to an inspection hatch in the roof. The firefighters decided 
to manually discharge the CO
2
 bottles though this hatch opening. 
When discharging the fifth CO
2
 cylinder, the silo exploded.
The firefighters were briefly enveloped in flames, but fortunately 
their personal protective equipment offered excellent protection 
and they suffered minor burn injuries only. Static discharges 
from the CO
2
 bottles may have ignited the pyrolysis gasses. It 
is conceivable that that the firefighters themselves inadvertently 
introduced the source of ignition that led to the explosion, which 
easily could have killed them had the blast been strong enough. 
HAZARD UNDER-APPRECIATED
A recent paper in Biomass and Bioenergy (Carbon dioxide not 
suitable for extinguishment of smouldering silo fires: Static 
electricity may cause silo explosion - Volume 108, January 2018, 
pages 113-119) examines international standards, guidelines, 
recent editions of frequently cited pellet handbooks and other 
literature. The paper argues that the electrostatic hazard of CO
2
 is 
widely under-appreciated, across countries. The situation appears 
particularly grave for NFPA 12 on carbon dioxide extinguishing 
systems, which gives ill-conceived advice on the application of 
CO
2
 to deep-seated fires involving solids subject to smouldering. 
NFPA 69 and NFPA 850 should also be revised to highlight the 
hazard.
PAST ACCIDENTS FORGOTTEN
In the past, major explosions have been attributed to electrostatic 
ignition of flammable vapours during the release of CO
2
 for fire-
prevention purposes. The most dramatic explosion may have 
been an explosion of a U.S. Air Force underground tank with 
JP-4 in 1954, which killed 37 people. The victims were officials, 
technicians and contractors who were standing on the roof of the 
tank while carrying out acceptance tests of the tank’s novel carbon 
dioxide fire extinguishing system. Unfortunately, there is evidence 
to suggest that those early lessons learned have at least partly 
passed out of sight.
We wish to alert the pellet community that suppression of a 
smouldering silo fire with carbon dioxide is potentially unsafe. 
Firefighters have no means to determine if the atmosphere in the 
silo headspace is ignitable. The release of liquid carbon dioxide is 
associated with electrostatic discharges with sufficient energy to 
ignite flammable pyrolysis gases. The result may be an internal 
explosion with loss of life. •
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